Third parties intervene in others' behaviors in various ways, such as punishing a harmdoer and/or helping a victim. Moreover, third parties may reward generous altruists. As such, various types of third-party intervention strategies are conceivable. Nevertheless, researchers have disproportionately focused on third-party punishment. In the present study, 87 undergraduate students were exposed to unfair, fair, and generous allocators and their recipients, and were allowed to punish, help, and/or reward the players. The results indicated that participants were more likely to punish unfair allocators than fair allocators; more likely to help recipients of unfair allocators than those of fair allocators; and more likely to reward generous allocators than fair allocators. Examinations of intraindividual associations of these strategies revealed that 2 prosocial strategies (third-party help and third-party reward) were strongly tied to each other (i.e., participants who helped victims of unfair allocators were more likely to reward generous allocators). However, third-party punishment was not significantly associated with the other 2 strategies. The emotional correlates of the 3 intervention strategies were also investigated. Third-party punishment was correlated with moral outrage and reduced empathic concern for unfair allocators. Third-party help was correlated with empathic concern for the victim. Third-party reward was correlated with empathic concern for generous allocators.
Punishment is defined as a behavior that reduces noncooperators' fitness to promote their cooperation in future interactions. By imposing punishment, punishers themselves typically incur some immediate costs (i.e., reduce their own fitness). But benefits of punishment accrue from the punished party's more cooperative behavior in the future (Clutton-Brock & Parker, 1995; Raihani, Thornton, & Bshary, 2012) . Although punishment that meets this definition is relatively rare in nonhuman animals (Raihani et al., 2012) , humans critically rely on punishment to maintain large-scale cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; Gintis, 2000) . Collective management of common natural resources is an example of large-scale cooperation (Hardin, 1968) . Suppose that in order to keep a forest sustainable, a community sets a rule regarding the maximum amount of wood that each community member can harvest each year. However, each member has an incentive to violate the rule because he or she can be better off by overharvesting wood to increase his or her personal income. Field research has shown that the presence of punishment against noncooperators (i.e., those who have violated the rule) predicts successful common resource management (Ostrom, 2000; Rustagi, Engel, & Kosfeld, 2010) . Experiments simulating this type of cooperation problem in laboratories have also shown that the cooperation rate increases by allowing group members to punish noncooperative members (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Yamagishi, 1986 ).
People's punitive tendency is also epitomized by so-called third-party punishment, where people punish noncooperators even when they themselves were not affected by the noncooperators' behavior. In the standard third-party punishment game (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b) , a participant observes the dictator game played by two players (the allocator and the recipient). The allocator is given a certain amount of endowment and is asked to divide it between him/herself and the recipient. The allocator can divide the resource as he or she likes, and thus behave like a dictator. Observing the allocator's decision, the participant (the third party) is asked to decide whether to spend some of his or her own endowment to reduce the allocator's payoff. If the third-party spends x game points, cx points will be subtracted from the allocator's payoff (where c is typically 2 or 3). In Fehr and Fischbacher's (2004b) seminal experiment, the allocator's unfair behaviors (e.g., giving only 10% of the endowment to the recipient) elicited costly punishment from the third-party participants. Third-party punishment has been observed in many subsequent experiments that varied in various ways, such as the experimental method to measure the third-party responses, types of the norms that were violated, and frequency of noncooperators (e.g., Bone, Silva, & Raihani, 2014; Jordan, McAuliffe, & Rand, 2016; Konishi & Ohtsubo, 2015; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Ohtsubo, Masuda, Watanabe, & Masuchi, 2010 ). Moreover, when tested using population-adjusted versions of the third-party punishment game, young children (e.g., McAuliffe, Jordan, & Warneken, 2015; Riedl, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2015) as well as people in small-scale societies (e.g., Henrich et al., 2006 Henrich et al., , 2010 Marlowe et al., 2008) have inflicted third-party punishment on noncooperators. Therefore, humans seem inherently punitive.
However, it is noteworthy that third-party punishment experiments have typically only allowed participants to punish noncooperators. Thus the apparent prevalence of a punitive tendency might be due to procedural constraints (Pedersen, Kurzban, & McCullough, 2013) . Outside the laboratory, punishment is only one intervention strategy that third parties can use. Third parties might help victims, instead of punishing violators. If the goal of punishment is to promote cooperation, it is also possible for third parties to reward cooperators, instead of punishing noncooperators. Although research on third-party intervention strategies has disproportionately focused on punishment, interest in other intervention strategies (i.e., third-party help and third-party reward) seems to be emerging (Almenberg, Dreber, Apicella, & Rand, 2011; Charness, Cobo-Reyes, & Jiménez, 2008; Gummerum, Van Dillen, Van Dijk, & López-Pérez, 2016; Hu, Strang, & Weber, 2015; Leliveld, van Dijk, & van Beest, 2012; Lotz, Baumert, Schlösser, Gresser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011; Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011) .
However, in the case of third-party help and reward, the question arises as to why third parties incur costs to increase unrelated others' well-being. A recently proposed adaptive function of third-party help is the signal of trustworthiness (Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016) . In fact, the costly signaling hypothesis of third-party intervention was originally developed in the context of third-party punishment (e.g., Barclay, 2006; Kurzban, DeScioli, & O'Brien, 2007) . According to this hypothesis, third-party punishment is a costly signal of punishers' cooperativeness. However, empirical support for this hypothesis has been, at best, mixed (see Raihani & Bshary, 2015a , for a review). Punishers in fact tend to earn a cooperative reputation (e.g., Barclay, 2006) , which, however, does not necessarily fare better than the reputations of other types of players, such as third-party helpers and rewarders (Horita, 2010; Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008; Ozono & Watabe, 2012; Raihani & Bshary, 2015b) . Raihani and Bshary (2015a) pointed out that punishment can signal not only the punishers' cooperativeness but their competitiveness as well. Accordingly, when other more prosocial options, such as helping and rewarding, are available, punishment becomes a less credible signal of third-parties' cooperativeness. Jordan, Hoffman, et al. (2016) tested the validity of this modified version of the costly signaling hypothesis of third-party punishment by conducting an experiment that combined the third-party punishment game with the trust game. In the experiment, there were four roles: the three roles in the standard third-party punishment game (i.e., allocator, recipient, third party) and the observer of the third-party punishment game. After learning whether or not the third party punished the unfair allocator in the third-party punishment game, the observer played the trust game with the third party. In particular, the observer decided what proportion of his or her endowment he or she would transfer to the third party (the second mover in the trust game). The transferred money was tripled and given to the second-mover. The second-mover then decided how much money to send back to the observer. Without the help option, third-party punishment was in fact a signal of the third-party players' cooperativeness: The observers trusted punishers more than nonpunishers, and the punishers actually behaved in a more trustworthy manner than the nonpunishers. However, once the thirdparty help option was introduced, the observers preferred helpers to punishers. Moreover, when both punishment and help options were available, punishers no longer behaved in a trustworthy manner (i.e., they did not return a fair share of their partner's money), while helpers behaved in a more trustworthy manner. These results indicate that third-party punishment is a less credible signal of cooperativeness than third-party help (a more prosocial intervention strategy), especially when players can choose to either punish a perpetrator or help a victim.
The modified version of the signaling hypothesis of third-party intervention presumes that prosocial intervention strategies, such as third-party help and reward, are more credible signals of cooperativeness than third-party punishment (Jordan, Hoffman, et al., 2016; Raihani & Bshary, 2015a) . It is interesting to note that nonnegligible portions of participants in previous studies produced a more credible signal (i.e., third-party help or reward) in combination with the less credible signal (i.e., third-party punishment). For example, in Lotz, Okimoto, et al.'s (2011) experiment, 42 .6% of participants used both punishment and help options (32.0% used the help option only and 6.7% used the punishment option only). Similarly, when participants were given the punishment and reward options in Almenberg et al.'s (2011) experiment, 36% of participants not only punished greedy allocators but also rewarded generous allocators (20% used the reward option only and 9% used the punishment option only). Given these findings, the question arises as to why a substantial portion of participants did not concentrate their resource on the more credible signal (i.e., help or reward), but instead split their resource between the two options. Participants might have attempted to enhance the credibility of the signal by assuming that observers would perceive someone who performs both (i.e., third-party punishment and help/ reward) as being more cooperative. This reasoning led to the prediction that when given all possible options (i.e., punish, help, and reward), participants would combine the most credible signals (i.e., help and reward), instead of combining one credible signal (i.e., help or reward) and one less credible signal (i.e., punish). Therefore, it was hypothesized that those who help a victim are also more likely to reward a generous allocator, while they are not necessarily more likely to punish a greedy allocator. This hypothesis is divided into the following two components.
Hypothesis 1a:
The intraindividual association between "help" and "reward" is stronger than the association between "punish" and "help."
Hypothesis 1b:
The intraindividual association between "help" and "reward" is stronger than the association between "punish" and "reward."
In no previous study were participants given all possible behavioral options at once. Therefore, in the present study, all options were made available to third-party participants to test the above hypotheses.
In addition, we explored the emotional correlates of these intervention strategies. Research has shown that moral outrage (or indignation) causes third-party punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; Gummerum et al., 2016; Jordan, McAuliffe, et al., 2016) . Lotz and colleagues also examined the effect of moral outrage and found that it predicted not only third-party punishment but also third-party help (Lotz, Baumert, et al., 2011; Lotz, Okimoto, et al., 2011) . Leliveld et al. (2012) examined the effects of empathic concern (Davis, 1983) , and revealed that participants high in trait empathic concern tended to help victims, while participants low in trait empathic concern tended to punish unfair players (see also Hu et al., 2015; Konishi, Oe, Shimizu, Tanaka, & Ohtsubo, 2017) . The effect of empathic concern on thirdparty help is consistent with evolutionary theories positing that compassion, which is conceptually similar to empathic concern, facilitates prosocial responses to someone's suffering (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010 ). This effect is also consistent with the well-established finding that empathy promotes altruistic behavior in general (Batson, 1991; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981) . To our knowledge, there has been no research directly examining the emotional correlates of third-party reward. However, it is plausible that empathic concern for generous allocators promotes third-party reward, as this is also a form of altruistic behavior. Based on the aforementioned previous studies, we formulated the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Moral outrage and reduced empathic concern for the unfair allocator are correlated with third-party punishment.
Hypothesis 2b: Moral outrage and empathic concern for the victim are correlated with third-party help.
Hypothesis 2c: Empathic concern for the generous allocator is correlated with thirdparty reward.
In summary, the primary purpose of the present study was to investigate the intraindividual associations among third-party intervention strategies. In particular, we hypothesized that third-party help and third-party reward would be more strongly tied together as compared to the association between third-party punishment and each of the two strategies. The secondary purpose was to examine the emotional correlates of each of the three intervention strategies. We particularly focused on anger at the noncooperators (i.e., moral outrage) as well as empathic concerns for unfair allocators, their victims, and generous allocators.
Method Participants and the Third-Party Intervention Game
This study involved two separate groups of undergraduate students. The first group of 11 undergraduate students (7 females and 4 males) played the dictator game with each other. The second group of 87 undergraduate students (49 females, 38 males, M age ϭ 19.87 years, SD ϭ 0.85) played the third-party role.
The rule of the third-party intervention game was as follows: Two players first play the dictator game (throughout the instructions, neutral language, such as the allocation game, allocator, and recipient, were used). The allocator receives 100 Japanese yen (100 JPY Ϸ US$0.80) as his or her endowment and decides how to allocate it between him/her and the recipient (with 5 JPY as the minimal unit of the allocation). The thirdparty player receives 100 JPY as his or her endowment. The third-party player is allowed to make any interventions he or she would like using his or her endowment. The intervention options comprise "to increase, decrease, or do nothing about the allocator's payoff" and "to increase, decrease, or do nothing about the recipient's payoff." If the third-party player chooses to either increase or decrease the other players' payoffs, he or she has to spend some of his or her endowment. The effect of the thirdparty player's spending on the target's payoff is twice as much as its effect on his or her own payoff. For example, if the third-party player decided to spend x JPY to decrease (or increase) the allocator's payoff and spend y JPY to increase (or decrease) the recipient's payoff, 2x JPY is subtracted from (or added to) the allocator's payoff and 2y JPY is added to (or subtracted from) the recipient's payoff. In this example, the third-party player's payoff would be (100 -x -y) JPY. The third-party player is allowed to increase/decrease the payoffs of both players, one of the two players, or none of the two players. Although the third-party player is allowed to spend any amount he or she wants (in increments of 5 JPY), it is not permitted to increase either player's payoff beyond 100 JPY or reduce either player's payoff below zero.
Notice that there was an asymmetry in the payoff between the third-party and the other two players. The allocator divided 100 JPY (i.e., the average payoff of the allocator and recipient was 50 JPY), while the third-party received 100 JPY for him/herself. We decided to give twice as much (i.e., 100 JPY) to the third-party participants so that their behaviors would not be restricted by any budgetary concerns (e.g., if the third-party participants were given only 50 JPY, for example, they might avoid being worse off than an unfair allocator by helping his or her recipient). In addition, this precluded envy from causing apparent punishment-like behavior (cf. Pedersen et al., 2013) .
The Task of the First Set of Participants
The first set of 11 participants played the allocation game with each other. Since the 11 participants knew each other before the experiment, they were told that their decisions would be kept strictly confidential to their partners. In addition to the above rules of the third-party intervention game, they were told that their photographs and their decisions would be shown to the second set of third-party participants (students of a different university in a distant city). Each of the 11 participants played the allocation game with every one of the other 10 participants as the allocator. Therefore, each participant was involved in 20 allocation games (10 games as the allocator and 10 games as the recipient). They were told that their reward for this study would be the sum of their payoffs in all 20 third-party intervention games.
The first set of participants were given 100 JPY for each round of the allocation game in which they played the allocator role. They decided how to allocate the endowment between themselves and their partner. Although the first set of participants were paid according to their actual payoffs, they took part in this study as a part of their psychology course. Accordingly, we explicitly asked them to include various allocations, such as unfair, fair, and generous allocations, in their 10 decisions, so that they would learn how others would react to different types of allocations. Therefore, their role in the experiment was somewhat similar to confederates. After making the 10 allocation decisions, they were individually photographed so that their pictures would be associated with their decisions in the later third-party intervention experiment. We decided to present these photographs to the third-party participants to enhance the reality of the experiment.
The Task of the Second Set of Participants
The second set of participants played the role of the third-party. Since the primary interest of this study was third-party intervention, in the subsequent sections, we refer to this second group as "participants." Each of the participants was presented with five allocations made by the first set of participants, and decided whether to intervene in five allocation game results (the five allocation games always involved 10 different players). Although we explained the rule of the third-party intervention game to participants, we did not inform them that the first set of participants had known each other before the experiment, had been involved in multiple rounds of the allocation game, and had been asked to include various allocations in their allocation decisions. Participants were told that they would earn the sum of the money that they did not spend on intervention in the five allocation games.
The five allocations consisted of fair allocations (giving the partner 45, 50, or 55 JPY out of 100 JPY), unfair allocations (giving less than 45 JPY to the partner), and generous allocations (giving more than 55 JPY to the partner).
1 The five allocations always included at least one fair, one unfair, and one generous allocation. Since there were five allocations, two of the three types of allocations were duplicated. However, unless otherwise noted, each participant's first response to each type of allocation was analyzed. The two other allocations were treated as fillers. We included the two filler allocations in order to minimize participants' suspicion-if they were exposed to only three different types of allocations (i.e., fair, unfair, generous), they might unnecessarily suspect deception.
Procedure
The main part of the study was conducted as part of larger data collection sessions. Each session involved 4 to 10 participants. Participants signed a consent form covering all studies included in the session. They first filled out a packet of individual differences questionnaires. After all participants completed the first packet of questionnaires, the experimenter explained the nature of the present study by projecting instruction slides on a large screen. The instructions read as follows: Other participants at a different university engaged in a series of allocation games. Participants will see the results of five different pairs in the allocation game. Their task is to make a series of five decisions regarding whether to spend some of their endowment (100 JPY for each decision) to modify each of the five allocations. In particular, for each allocation game, the pictures of the allocator and the recipient are presented on the left-and righthand sides of the screen, respectively, along with the allocator's decision. Each picture is accompanied by a response box in which participants choose to either increase, decrease, or do nothing about the corresponding player's payoff. If they choose to increase or decrease it, they are asked to determine how much they will spend to do so.
After confirming that participants understood the above instructions, they moved to another experimental laboratory. In the laboratory, there were five separate cubicles, each equipped with a laptop computer. When fewer than six participants were involved in the session, all participants moved and engaged in the third-party intervention experiment simultaneously. When there were more than five participants, half of them first moved and engaged in this study, while the remaining participants stayed in the original room and filled out the second set of questionnaires. Once the first half of participants completed the experiment, the remaining participants then moved to the laboratory and engaged in the third-party intervention experiment.
In the laboratory, participants individually took part in this experiment. They made the intervention decisions for each of the five allocations consecutively. First, they were shown one allocation decision accompanied by the pictures of a pair of players, and they decided whether to change the allocator's payoff (and if so, how much) and whether to change the recipient's payoff (and if so, how much). To confirm participants' understanding, we asked them to enter the final payoffs of the three players (the allocator, the recipient, and themselves) in three corresponding boxes that appeared on the screen right after they made the two decisions. Once participants finalized their intervention decisions, they were presented with 12 emotional words and were asked to indicate how strongly they felt each of the 12 emotions for the allocator on a 6-point scale (0 ϭ do not feel at all to 5 ϭ very strongly feel). These emotion items comprised five anger items (i.e., angry, indignant, mad, outraged, perturbed), five empathic concern items (i.e., sympathetic, compassionate, warm, tender, softhearted), and two envy items (i.e., envious, jealous). The anger items were adapted from Batson et al.'s (2007) study on anger at moral violations. The empathic concern items were adapted from Batson et al.'s (1981) study on the empathy-altruism hypothesis. The envy items were written by the authors. On the next screen, they were asked to rate how strongly they felt the same 12 emotions for the recipient on a 6-point scale. Participants repeated the same procedure five times. After completing the game experiment, participants moved back to the original room and completed the remaining part of the experimental session.
Participants received their monetary reward for the allocation game at the end of the experimental session. The rewards for the other parts of the session were paid into their bank account after a few weeks. To determine the reward for the first group of participants, we randomly chose some responses from those in the second group. The 11 participants in the first group were paid according to their own decisions and the intervention decisions of those in the second group. This experiment was approved by the research ethics committee of the Graduate School of Humanities, Kobe University.
Results

Basic Pattern of Strategy Uses
Third-party punishment, help, and reward were operationally defined as follows. If participants spent their resource to reduce the allocator's payoff in the unfair condition, it was considered an instance of third-party punishment. If participants increased the recipient's payoff in the unfair condition, it was considered an instance of third-party help. If participants increased the allocator's payoff in the generous condition, it was considered an instance of third-party reward. There were two additional possible responses. If participants reduced the recipient's payoff in the generous condition, it was considered an instance of spite. If participants reduced the allocator's payoff in the generous condition, it was considered an instance of antisocial punishment (Herrmann, Thöni, & Gächter, 2008) .
To visually inspect whether these strategies were used in response to the expected allocations (i.e., third-party punishment and help in the unfair condition, and third-party reward in the generous condition), we computed the relative frequencies of the use of each option as a function of allocation. For this visual inspection, we included each participant's responses to all five allocations, which yielded 435 responses (see Figure 1) . Since no participants in the first group chose one moderately unfair allocation (75/25 to allocator/ recipient) and two extremely generous allocations (0/100 and 5/95), these three allocations do not appear in Figure 1 . There are three prominent patterns in Figure 1 . First, third-party punishment and help increased as allocations became unfair (see the right-hand side of Figure 1) . Second, third-party rewards were prevalent when the allocator behaved in a generous manner (see the left-hand side of Figure 1 ). Third, participants rarely used spite (only 5 of 87 participants reduced the recipient's payoff in the generous condition) or antisocial punishment (no participants reduced the generous allocator's resource). The first two patterns are in line with the general notions of punishment, help, and reward.
Frequencies of Strategy Uses and Sex Differences
We then confirmed the validity of the above visual inspections by comparing the frequency of each of the three strategies in the fair (control) condition and the frequency in the relevant condition (i.e., the unfair condition for thirdparty punishment and help, and the generous condition for third-party reward). In response to the first unfair allocation that they saw, 25 of 87 participants (.29) decided to reduce the unfair allocator's payoff, whereas only three participants (.03) did so in response to the first fair allocation. The difference was significant by McNemar's test, 2 (1) ϭ 20.05, p Ͻ .001. For third-party help, 48 participants (.55) increased the recipient's payoff in the unfair condition, while 22 participants (.24) did so in the fair condition, 2 (1) ϭ 21.81, p Ͻ .001. For thirdparty reward, 54 participants (.62) increased the allocator's payoff in the generous condition, while 23 participants (.26) did so in the fair condition, 2 (1) ϭ 25.71, p Ͻ .001. These results indicate that third-party punishment, help, and reward were more frequently used in the relevant condition than in the fair (control) condition. In contrast, for spite, only five partici- pants (.06) decreased the recipient's payoff in the generous condition, and three participants (.03) did so in the fair condition, 2 (1) ϭ 0.13, ns. This result implies that in this study, no meaningful pattern of use was observed for spite. As we noted, we observed no instances of antisocial punishment. Therefore, we did not include spite and antisocial punishment in the subsequent analyses.
We also compared whether some strategies were more likely to be used than others. A series of McNemar's tests indicated that participants were more likely to help the victim of the unfair allocator (.55) than punish the unfair allocator (.29), 2 (1) ϭ 13.08, p Ͻ .001; they were also more likely to reward the generous allocator (.62) than to punish the unfair allocator (.29),
2
(1) ϭ 19.12, p Ͻ .001; however, they were not significantly more likely to reward the generous allocator (.62) than to help the victim of the unfair allocator (.55), 2 (1) ϭ 2.08, p ϭ .149.
The sex difference in the punishment rate (.32 and .27 for men and women, respectively) was not significant by Fisher's exact test (p ϭ .639). However, the sex difference was significant for the help rate (.34 and .71 for men and women, respectively) and for the reward rate (.42 and .78 for men and women, respectively) (p Ͻ .001) for both comparisons by Fisher's exact test.
We also measured the amount of the cost participants were willing to incur for each decision. However, third-party punishment and help were subject to the same budget constraint, as both were responses to the first unfair allocations (participants had to decide how to spend their 100 JPY endowment for punishment and help simultaneously), while third-party reward was independent of the constraint, as it was the response to the first generous allocation (participants decided how much of their 100 JPY they would spend almost solely on this intervention, given that few participants behaved in a spiteful manner to the recipients of generous allocations). Therefore, even if we observed more spending on reward than on the other two intervention strategies, it could have been due to either participants' preference or budget constraint. For this reason, we focused on the dichotomous variables indicating whether participants chose to use each intervention strategy, and we did not analyze the amount of cost.
Intraindividual Associations of Intervention Strategies
The intraindividual association between third-party punishment and help is shown in the top panel of Table 1 ; this association was marginally significant by Fisher's exact test (p ϭ .058). The corresponding intraindividual correlation between punishment and help, designated as r(punish, help), was .21 (the correlations reported in this section are computationally equivalent to phi coefficients). The intraindividual association between third-party punishment and reward (shown in the middle panel of Note. The top panel shows the 2 ϫ 2 cross-table based on participants' uses of the punishment and help options. The middle panel shows the 2 ϫ 2 cross-table based on participants' uses of the punishment and reward options. The bottom panel shows the 2 ϫ 2 cross-table based on participants' uses of the help and reward options. Hypotheses 1a and 1b predicted that r(help, reward) would be greater than r(punish, help) and r(punish, reward). A series of Williams's tests for two correlated correlations (performed using the r.test function in the psych package of R) indicated that r(help, reward) was significantly higher than r(punish, help), t(84) ϭ 5.02, p Ͻ .001, and r(punish, reward), t(84) ϭ 5.47, p Ͻ .001. Therefore, Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported-participants were more likely to use two prosocial intervention strategies together than to combine one prosocial strategy with the punitive strategy (i.e., third-party punishment).
Remember that there was a significant sex difference in the help and reward rates. In order to confirm that the above patterns would not be modified by the sex difference, we computed the same correlations for males and females separately: r(punish, help) was .23 and .28 for males and females, respectively (cf. it was .21 when the two sexes were combined); r(punish, reward) was .22 and .21 for males and females, respectively (cf. the combined r ϭ .18); and r(help, reward) was .62 and .74 for males and females, respectively (cf. the combined r ϭ .72). The significance pattern revealed by a series of Fisher's exact tests was the same except that the originally marginally significant association between punish and help became nonsignificant in the male sample.
Emotional Correlates of Each Strategy
We then computed point-biserial correlations among the three intervention strategies and emotional responses (see Table 2 ). Recall that participants indicated their levels of anger (five items), empathic concern (five items), and envy (two items) for each of the two players (i.e., the allocator and the recipient). The anger and empathic concern items were associated with reasonable levels of Cronbach's alpha coefficients (see Table 2 ), whereas the alpha coefficients of the envy items were low (correlations between the two items ranged between .14 and .46). Therefore, envy scores in the present study are not reliable. However, to avoid problems of selective reports, we decided to include the correlations involving the envy score.
Confirming Hypothesis 2a, both moral outrage (i.e., anger at the unfair allocator) and reduced empathic concern for the unfair allocator were significantly correlated with third-party punishment. However, Hypothesis 2b was only partly supported. Although empathic concern for the victim was significantly correlated with third-party help, moral outrage was not significantly correlated with third-party help. The sig- nificant correlations relevant to Hypotheses 2a and 2b remained significant after controlling for the effect of sex (see the corresponding partial correlations in brackets in Table 2 ).
In the generous condition, we computed the point-biserial correlations between third-party reward and emotional responses. Confirming Hypothesis 2c, empathic concern for the generous allocator was significantly correlated with third-party reward. As shown in brackets, the partial correlation between empathic concern for the allocator and third-party reward remained significant even after controlling for the effect of sex. Unexpectedly, the two envy scores (associated with the generous allocator and his or her recipient) were significantly correlated with third-party reward. However, these correlations became nonsignificant after controlling for the effect of sex. Moreover, as we already noted, the reliability of the envy scores was low. Therefore, we refrain from interpreting significant correlations between third-party reward and the two envy scores.
Discussion
This study examined participants' responses to both unfair and generous allocations. For these two types of allocations, there are three meaningful third-party intervention strategies: punishing unfair allocators, helping the victims of unfair allocation, and rewarding generous allocators. The results indicate that participants employed these three intervention strategies more frequently in the relevant situation than in the irrelevant, control condition (i.e., in response to the fair allocation). Moreover, those who helped the victim in the unfair condition were more likely to reward the allocator in the generous condition. This intraindividual association was stronger than the association between punishment and each of the two other strategies. This pattern is consistent with the costly signaling hypothesis of third-party intervention: participants signal their cooperativeness by intervening in a resource allocation in which they are not directly involved. Raihani and Bshary (2015a) pointed out that prosocial intervention strategies are more credible signals of cooperativeness because punishment, which is a less prosocial strategy, can signal both cooperativeness and competitiveness. Jordan, Hoffman, et al. (2016) found that participants actually endorsed third-party help more than third-party punishment as a signal of cooperativeness. This study extended this finding by showing that third-party helpers were more likely to use another prosocial strategy-namely, third-party reward. Apparently, prosocial people attempt to enhance signal credibility by combining the two prosocial signals.
We also investigated the emotional correlates of each of the three intervention strategies. As predicted from previous studies, third-party punishment was correlated with moral outrage and reduced empathic concern for the unfair allocator. Empathic concern for the victim was correlated with third-party help. Although these patterns corroborate previously reported findings, we failed to replicate one interesting finding. Gummerum et al. (2016) found a significant correlation between third-party help and empathic anger at the unfair allocator. Admittedly, we did not measure empathic anger separately from "overall" anger at the unfair allocator, which might have comprised empathic anger and moral outrage (see Batson, 2011 , for the differences between these two emotions). In future studies, the effects of moral outrage, which supposedly promotes punishment, and empathic anger, which may promote help for the victim, should be separated and more carefully examined.
In addition, consistent with the empathyaltruism hypothesis (Batson, 1991) , empathic concern for the generous allocator promoted third-party reward. Although we used the same empathic concern items across targets and conditions, empathic concern for generous allocators is plausibly associated with moral elevation and the feeling of warmth, while empathic concern for victims is conceivably associated with compassion, sympathy and pity (Goetz et al., 2010) . These are likely distinct emotional responses, and future studies need more nuanced measures of the different aspects of empathic responses.
The costly signaling hypothesis of third-party intervention predicted that participants would use prosocial strategies, and abandon the ambiguous signal (i.e., third-party punishment). Nevertheless, a nonnegligible portion of participants (.29) still inflicted punishment. In addition, we observed that third-party punishment and help had different sets of emotional correlates. Therefore, it seems premature to conclude that every punitive intervention observed under the restricted intervention options can be subsumed under the cooperative signal. This result suggests that at least some percentage of people punish noncooperators simply for the sake of punishing them. This is consistent with the result of a recent theoretical model predicting a mixed-strategy equilibrium where punishers and nonpunishers coexist-not everyone has to be a punisher (Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010) . However, critics might question the external validity of this result because the laboratory version of third-party punishment (i.e., a lone punisher inflicts punishment against noncooperators) is rarely observed in fields (Baumard, 2010; Guala, 2012) . To reconcile the experimental results with the field observations, it is worth noting that people in fields often rely on a coordinated or centralized punitive measure to maintain large-scale cooperation (e.g., Rustagi et al., 2010; Wiessner, 2005) . Although coordinated/centralized punishment is not the same as third-party punishment operationalized in laboratory (i.e., private punishment), without punitive motivation, people might not even think about any centralized systems of punishment against noncooperators. In addition, a recent study showed that although people preferred having the reward option to having the punishment option in the public goods experiment, punishment promoted cooperation more than reward (Sutter, Haigner, & Kocher, 2010) . Therefore, we should not stop studying psychological mechanisms of punishment.
One limitation of this study is that we did not provide participants any explicit incentives to acquire a prosocial reputation. Jordan, Hoffman, et al. (2016) , in contrast, gave participants an explicit incentive to signal their prosociality to their potential interaction partners. This might appear to be a crucial flaw in studies that aim at testing the costly signaling hypothesis of third-party intervention strategies. Nevertheless, it is likely that prosocial behaviors, whose ultimate function is to obtain a good reputation, are at least partly driven by emotions (e.g., empathic concern). Accordingly, people may engage in prosocial behaviors (i.e., signaling behaviors) without any conscious awareness of their reputational effects because the emotional proximate mechanism commits people to adaptive behaviors (Frank, 1988) . In future studies, it is desirable to investigate the effect of the presence of reputational incentives to closely examine the underlying (conscious and unconscious) motivations of these prosocial strategies. Further research on psychological mechanisms promoting different types of third-party intervention strategies seems necessary to fully understand large-scale cooperation among humans.
